"The Art of Action"

I recently finished an incredible book by the British historian, management consultant, leadership expert, and author Stephen Bungay called The Art of Action.  The title of his book comes from a quote by the 19th century Prussian general Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), who said "Strategy is a system of expedients.  It is more than a science, it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the evolution of an original guiding idea under constantly changing circumstances, the art of taking action under the pressure of the most difficult conditions" (I added the underline).

I talked about Bungay previously in my post "Friction and Leadership", in which I discussed Bungay's three gaps - the Knowledge Gap (i.e. the gap between what leaders would like to know about a particular situation versus what they actually know), the Alignment Gap (i.e. the gap between what leaders want their teams to do versus what they actually do), and the Effects Gap (i.e. the gap between what is intended versus what is desired, in terms of outcomes).  The typical leadership response to these gaps is to demand more detail.  We close the Knowledge Gap by asking for more detailed data.  We close the Alignment Gap by issuing more detailed instructions.  And we close the Effects Gap by exercising more detailed control.  Unfortunately, these approaches almost never work, because we operate in a VUCA world.

Bungay talks about the right way to address these three Gaps by applying lessons learned about strategy and tactics from the Prussian military.  Prussian Army generals such as Carl von Clausewitz (who wrote the classic treatise on strategy On War) and von Moltke addressed the Knowledge Gap by limiting instructions and directions to simply articulating the strategic intent, focusing on the overall mission and specific objectives.  They addressed the Alignment Gap by allowing front-line leaders to define how they would achieve the mission and objectives.  And they addressed the Effects Gap by empowering front-line leaders to adjust their actions in line with the mission and objectives.  

As the business leader Jack Welch said in 1981, "The Prussian General Staff, under the elder von Moltke...did not expect a plan of operations to survive beyond the first contact with the enemy.  They set only the broadest of objectives and emphasized seizing unforeseen opportunities as they arose...Strategy was not a lengthy action plan.  It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances."

The back cover of the book (at least the edition that I checked out from our local public library) summarizes the theme of the book into three points:

1. Most managers see the key problem of strategy execution as getting people to do what is in the plans.  Actually the problem is usually in the plans specifying the results and the actions, not in the people.

2. When we aren't getting the results we want, we tend to react by going into more detail and exercising tighter control.  This just makes things worse.  What we need is not more detail but more clarity, not tighter control but better direction.

3. To execute effectively we need to abandon multiple objectives and decide what we really want; get the message across by telling people what to achieve and why, and asking them what they are going to do as a result; and give them freedom of action within defined boundaries.

If all of this sounds familiar, it's because I've written about these concepts over and over again.  These leadership concepts can be called Auftragstaktik, mission command, and "deference to expertise", and they were first described by Prussian military leaders like Clausewitz and von Moltke.  Bungay extends these lessons to organizations outside of the military.

What I also found interesting about the book is that Bungay incorporates concepts from fields such as chaos theory and complexity theory (specifically, complex adaptive systems) to extend and complement his own particular theories on leadership, many of which were first articulated by the Prussian generals that he so clearly admires.  For example, during Clausewitz's day, scientists tried but were unsuccessful in explaining in mathematical terms the behavior of a pendulum.  Scientists as brilliant and as famous as Isaac Newton could not calculate the motion of the moon orbiting the Earth while the Earth orbited the Sun - the so-called "three body problem".   Bungay suggests that the reason scientists consistently failed is because the science of the day was linear, yet the behavior of pendulums and the three body problem were non-linear.  

Recall that a linear system has two defining characteristics.  First, it is proportional, in that a small input produces a small output, and a large input produces a large output.  Second, it is additive, in that the whole is the exact sum of the parts.  Non-linear systems behave very differently, in that they are neither proportional (e.g. a small input can produce a large output) nor additive (the whole is, in fact, greater than the sum of the parts).  We live in a non-linear world, so we shouldn't think in linear terms.  That lesson was true for leadership in war (since Clausewitz and von Moltke's era), and it is even truer for leadership in general today.  Clausewitz applied terms like friction, chance, and unpredictably, to his theories on military strategy, and these concepts are found in chaos theory and complexity theory today.

Overall, Bungay provides some fascinating insights on leadership and strategy.  I left several dog-leaf marks on my library's copy, and I will likely purchase a copy of the book for future use and reference.  It's great when you discover that your own theories and beliefs about leadership align with others, which is probably why I liked this book so much.  I hope to discuss the book again, or at least some more concepts from the book, in future posts!